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Anthony “Tony” Podesta was born on October 24, 1943 in Chicago, Illinois to Mary and John D. 
Podesta, Sr.  He grew up in Chicago, along with his brother, John D. Podesta, Jr.  He attended 
the University of Illinois at Chicago, and graduate school at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT).  During the 1968 presidential campaign, he left school to work for Eugene 
McCarthy.  After the 1968 campaign, Podesta worked for a short time in admissions offices 
before becoming active in Edmund S. Muskie's 1972 presidential campaign.  Podesta has 
continued his work as a political consultant in Washington, D.C. 
 
 
Scope and Content Note 
 
Interview includes discussions of: graduate studies at MIT; 1968 McCarthy campaign; 1968 
convention and student response; Joe Duffey Senate campaign; 1972 Muskie campaign; 
Manchester, New Hampshire incident and William Loeb; David Broder; New Hampshire 
Primary; Chris Spirou; Dunfey family; organizing candidates in 1968; running a general election 
campaign instead of a primary campaign; hiring of Rose Economu as the first fulltime female 
advance person; Muskie's interaction with the voters; recollections of Richard Daley in Chicago; 
family political interest; and Muskie's legacy. 
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Tony Podesta:   I was born October 24, 1943 in Chicago, Illinois, and my parents are John D. 
Podesta, Sr. and Mary Podesta.  I have a brother, John D. Podesta, Jr., and that was the family.  
And John and I worked for Senator Muskie in his presidential campaign in 1972 in Illinois, New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts, and many other places. 
 
Don Nicoll:   The interviewer today is Don Nicoll.  And Tony, were you always interested in 
politics? 
 
TP:   I was.  Well, I was, I grew up in Chicago and so we grew up with Mayor [Richard] Daley 
as the dominant force in our community, and got interested in politics as a college student, 
studied political science and worked, was in graduate school at MIT in 1968 when the 1968 
campaign occurred and got carried away by it and ran off to New Hampshire for a couple of 
months, and then traveled around the country with Eugene McCarthy and then later worked in 
the general election in that campaign, which was my first connection with Ed.  I never really met 
him, but it was my first sort of association with Senator Muskie, who of course did so well. 
 
DN:    What were you studying at MIT? 
 
TP:    I was working on my Ph.D. in political science and urban social policy at MIT, which is 
what I had studied in college at the University of Illinois in Chicago. 
 
DN:    Was Bob Wood there then? 
 
TP:    Yes, he was, and Ithiel de Sola Pool [Chair of the Department], the whole collection of 
very distinguished faculty members, interesting group of people, and I loved it there but sort of 
failed.  I guess I got bit by the political bug more than by the academic bug. 
 
DN:    And where had you done your undergraduate work? 
 
TP:    University of Illinois in Chicago. 
 
DN:    Now, in the 1968 campaign you said you worked in the general campaign.  What were 
you doing? 
 
TP:    We were trying to, a bunch of us who worked, had worked in the McCarthy campaign ran 
around trying to organize students to be for Humphrey-Muskie, and that was my job.  In the 
McCarthy campaign I was a, did field work in the early days and then ended up running the 
scheduling advance operation in California and later states. 
 
DN:    Now, were you, after the nominations and your working in the general campaign with 
college students, were you going all around the country? 
 
TP:    Yeah, traveling around the country.  But never, but sort of, I was organizing rather than 
traveling with the, anywhere, so I never bumped into either of the candidates.  So I never saw 
Vice President [Hubert] Humphrey or Senator Muskie but had some connection to, some very 
small connection to their effort.  And I was trying also to go back to school, so I was doing it 
part time because I had disappeared during the spring semester of my second year in graduate 
school, so I wanted to try to get the professors in that school to remember who I was, so I tried to 
spend a little more time at Cambridge. 
 
DN:    Did you get a sense in that campaign of how well the students were responding to the two 
candidates after the miserable time around the convention? 
 
TP:    Well, the convention was terrible.  I was in fact, was at the convention, and I was running 
the scheduling advance operation for McCarthy.  And it was the scheduling advance suite which 
was the suite that the police raided, I guess it was Thursday night, or Wednesday night, sort of 
after it was all over, and broke a couple of billy clubs on people's heads.  It was kind of an awful 
experience, not just for the people who were demonstrating in the streets, but even for the people 
who were involved in the convention. 
 
So it took everybody a while to recover from that and get back to work on what was important, 
and what was important was electing two good guys to those two important offices and making 
sure that Richard Nixon didn't arrive there.  But we ended up running a, it was a difficult task for 
the vice president to sort of thread the needle with President Johnson and try to both build on his 
service and also kind of suggest that he wanted to do something different, but we ended up 
coming a little bit short.  Which was bad, but it also gave me a chance to then sign up for the 
Muskie for president campaign in '72, or in '71 actually. 
 
DN:    Now, what did you do after the campaign of '68? 
 
TP:    I went back to MIT and did some, finished my course work on my Ph.D.  And then I 
ended up becoming a, at the time there were graduate student deferments and, which I enjoyed 
for a while, and then they announced that they were ending those.  So I was faced with a choice 
of either being drafted or finding a different way to, a different deferment, so I took a job as a 
teacher and taught political science and was the director of admissions of a small Catholic 
women's college outside Chicago called Barat College, B-A-R-A-T, and did that for a year until 
I was no longer eligible for the draft, and then started heading back to MIT to work on my 
dissertation but got waylaid by Anne Wexler and Joe Duffey. 
 
Anne was the campaign chairman and Joe was the candidate for the Senate in Connecticut, there 
were two other candidates in the primary, and they were, and Ann convinced me to sort of work 
the primary.  It was August 19th, classes started on September 7th, so I figured I could, you 
know, earn a few dollars, have some fun, work for a good guy.  He was going to lose and I was 
going back to school, but it turned out that he won the primary and we all started measuring our 
offices for, you know, where we were going to sit in the Senate office.  And I decided to 
postpone going back to school for another semester.  And then we ended up losing the general 
election to Lowell Weicker, and I ended up never really going up to school. 
 
I ended up coming to Washington at that point, came here to work for Common Cause.  It was 
one of the first, in the very early days, the very beginning of Common Cause, worked there for, 
sort of the end of, from the end of 1970 through the middle of 1971 when, which is when the 
presidential campaigns were heating up and people were picking sides.  And I picked, you know, 
I picked Ed Muskie and so had conversations with George Mitchell and Berl Bernhard and some 
of the other folks over there and ended up signing on to leave, ended up quitting Common Cause 
and going to work in the Muskie for president campaign. 
 
DN:    Why did you decide to get involved in the Muskie campaign?  What in those 
conversations convinced you? 
 
TP:    Well, it wasn't the conversations, I was for, I mean, it was the conversations with those 
people that convinced me.  I was, I felt Muskie was incredibly impressive and was the, you 
know, would be both a very fine president and a very fine candidate.  I was, I think I was more 
right about his being a fine president than I may have been about his being a fine candidate, but I 
thought both.  And some of my friends were going to work for McGovern and other candidates, 
but I thought Muskie was the best, was the class of the field.  And so it was really only a 
question of whether or not they needed me to work in the campaign, or I'd go back to school, not 
a question of whether or not I'd be for Muskie, whether or not if I couldn't get a job with Muskie 
I'd go to work for McGovern.  I actually was planning to go back to school but then got sort of 
recruited into working on the Muskie campaign, and was very happy to do that. 
 
DN:    And when did you go to work on the campaign? 
 
TP:    Right around the middle of '71, June, July, somewhere in there, and I started traveling.  
My initial assignment was to worry about the six New England states and Illinois.  I didn't really 
have to worry about Maine, I mean, that was sort of five New England states.  The notion that I 
would have to worry about Maine was, of course, preposterous.  But I was sort of, so I was a 
little bit spending my time between Manchester, Boston and Chicago trying to organize the early 
part of the campaign, trying to get people signed on, trying to get elected officials signed on, 
trying to get volunteers organized, trying to get the delegate slates put together, the sorts of 
things that one does at the very beginning stages, and trying to lay the groundwork for what 
would be a hard fought race. 
 
And I ended up taking up residency in New Hampshire, sort of living in, you know, after 
organizing in a number of places I ended up.  As New Hampshire became, as it became clearer 
and clearer that New Hampshire would be a big test, we, you know, I sort of spent the winter in 
New Hampshire.  And we ended up, I guess we, you know, I guess there sort of two pivotal 
events in the campaign occurred there.  One was when Senator Muskie did his speech about Bill 
Loeb and Jane Muskie and he cried, and the other was when he beat McGovern but then let the, 
but then seemed so, McGovern seemed so exultant and he seemed so disappointed that we sort of 
allowed McGovern to walk away with the, you know, snatch a victory from the jaws of defeat, 
which sort of turned, which gave McGovern an enormous amount of momentum. 
 
Those two events, I think, made a huge difference with people's perceptions of Senator Muskie.  
This is funny now that sort of like everybody cries in politics, you know, this president cries, the 
last president cries.  But, you know, it's not very long ago, it's thirty years ago, the notion that a 
man would shed a tear about something he cared about was just sort of like disqualifying to some 
people.  But now it's become sort of a necessary qualification; if you don't cry now you can't be 
president.  Then it was if you did cry you can't be president.  Amazing how time changes. 
 
DN:    Can you recall the circumstances of that event when he made the speech at Manchester 
Union Leader? 
 
TP:    Sure, he came in the night before, and it was I think the day before that Loeb had written 
this really nasty editorial about Jane Muskie which had gotten under the senator's skin.  And he 
came in with a, you know, said, “I want to get a, I want a flatbed truck, I want a sound system, I 
want to go stand out in front of that newspaper and I want to tell that guy what I think of him.” 
 
He was, you know, he was, he had a, his, I'm probably not the first person to say he had a bit of a 
temper.  And he was sort of pounding on the table and raising his voice and was really furious 
with Loeb, and furious with what he had said about Jane, and furious with the fact that he had 
attacked, you know, brought his family into it and it was sort of really a low blow. 
 
And so we all, you know, he got in at like, I don't know, it was ten o'clock at night and we were 
all scurrying around to do an open air speech at nine o'clock the next morning, which was not the 
easiest advance assignment we had but we managed to sort of get it all together.  And I don't 
think he, you know, I think he just planned to speak his mind and ended up, his voice cracked 
and he stopped for a moment, and he, you know, he finished what he was doing, he got back in 
the car, we went on to the next stop. 
 
I was actually in the car with him and he said to me, when we got in the car, he said, “I wish,” he 
said, “I shouldn't have broken down like that.”  And I said, “Oh, you know, it's a human, you're a 
human being, it's a human situation.  People want to, you know, it's not, I don't think people will 
. . . .”  Shows you how smart I was.  You know, I kind of tried to say, you know, that it all 
seemed authentic and real, this was not a canned political speech, this was not something your 
speech writer wrote for you, you know, you're speaking from the gut, that's what people want to 
hear from you.  You know, what is it, what do you have in your gut that says you should be the 
next president.  So I said, “Don't worry about it, it's a good thing.” 
 
So we went on to the next stop, another one, and then he flew off to another state.  And I got a 
call from Bob Squier I remember, saying, Bob called and we had this conver-, he probably had 
the same conversation that I had with Senator Muskie, you know, was it a good thing or a bad 
thing, was it a terrible thing and so forth and so on.  And Bob said, “Oh no, it's a great thing.  It 
humanizes him; it's fabulous.”  But it turned out that, it turned out I guess a little bit otherwise. 
 
Saturday, it was a Saturday morning when this happened.  Saturday night, the evening news ran, 
didn't mention it.  Sunday the New Hampshire papers didn't mention it, Boston Globe didn't 
mention it.  On Sunday morning the Washington Post, though, David Broder, did a story in 
which he almost suggested that for someone to break down and, you know, someone to cry in 
public was evidence of mental stability and therefore how could you be president if you were so, 
if you were, if you couldn't control your emotions like that, which was on the front page of the 
Washington Post.  And the Washington Post news service then circulated and it was, on Monday 
morning it was on the front page of the Boston Globe and front page of the Chicago Sun Times, 
and the front page of the Milwaukee Journal.  And the next several primaries they had this 
Broder story which kind of made it all into a very different thing.  And it was, you know, and the 
networks all by Monday night all had, you know, sort of big stories on, you know, is Muskie out 
of it.  Saturday night it was sort of like it was fine, but you know. 
 
So one of my, you know, one of the things about the whole experience was if David Broder had 
not been there, no one would ever have remembered this.  It was only because of David Broder 
that this, that Ed Muskie crying became a kind of, you know, history changing political event.  
The rest of the journalists, you know, Jim Naughton who was covering the campaign for the New 
York Times, had a story in the Sunday New York Times on page A27, and it was in the sixteenth 
paragraph that Muskie's voice cracked with emotion when he attacked Bill Loeb.  So it was 
clearly, you know, New York Times thought it was nothing, the networks all thought it was 
nothing.  But Broder just drove the story, and then we sort of reeled for a while after that. 
 
DN:    Who were some of the other people involved in that campaign in New Hampshire that 
you remember most vividly? 
 
TP:    Well, the person I talked with the most about it was, at headquarters, was George 
Mitchell, who was sort of the guy I dealt with the most.  Eliot Cutler I talked, in headquarters, I 
got with a lot because Muskie was spending a bunch of time there, although we were always 
fighting about him spending, they always wanted him to go, you know, do ten markets, do three 
markets a day and travel all over the country.  And I was always saying, don't take this for 
granted, you know, this is retail politics, you got to come and ask for their votes.  And they were 
all saying, no, we'll get there in a couple weeks.  So we sort of had all that, the standard 
arguments that one has when one is in the field versus the ones in the headquarters. 
 
But in the headquarters the staff was, you know, was relatively small.  It was myself, there was a 
guy named Ron Rosenblath who was from Boston and who was, had run for office in, run for the 
state senate in Massachusetts and had been involved in politics.  There was my brother, John 
Podesta, who later went on to a little more glorious career with a different president.  And the 
local person who was in charge was a woman named Maria Carrier, she was like the local 
coordinator, she was the one who famously said, “If Muskie doesn't get fifty percent, I'll shoot 
myself.”  So when he got forty-eight point nine [48.9] percent, we got her a gun and she refused 
to keep her word. 
 
She was the one who sort of, was sort of, helped to set the bar high.  That winning wasn't 
enough, we needed to win by an absolute majority against the field, and indeed the press sort of 
held us to that.  And I think Muskie didn't help that, with that, he kind of gave a concession 
speech instead of a victory speech, and McGovern gave a victory speech instead of a concession 
speech.  And then we had Maria Carrier saying we lost, so.  The other person I remember pretty 
well is Hugh Gallen who later went on to, was one of our, was one of the co-chairs of the 
campaign.  He was a terrific guy, went on to be governor, later passed away, but was very active 
with us.  And Chris Fiero - 
 
DN:    What kind of a fellow was -? 
 
TP:    The other person I remember most vividly is Chris Spirou.  He [Hugh Gallen] was a, you 
know, he was from northern New Hampshire.  He was kind of taciturn, quiet, a bit more like 
Muskie than almost like anybody else, you know.  Kind of a, a good guy, smart, decent, hard 
working, a little bit frustrated with the people from Washington not kind of, not listening to, you 
know, not listening to him any more than they listened to me about what they needed to do in 
New Hampshire.  I don't think there's ever been a campaign in which that doesn't happen.  
(Telephone interruption). 
 
DN:    - Chris Spirou. 
 
TP:    Chris Spirou was a character, he was sort of, he was a state legislator, just arrived, spoke 
with a thick Greek accent.  Was just, had sort of, you know, recently naturalized U.S. citizen, 
was sort of the boss of Manchester, was the guy who was running around, you know, trying to 
organize precincts and organizing people everywhere.  I've actually seen him recently; he's 
running the American Center in Athens.  You should, if you want somebody to go over and 
interview him, I'd be happy to take the assignment.  But he's doing very well, and we still talk 
about the Muskie campaign.  I had dinner with him last year in Athens and we were trading 
stories. 
 
So he went on to be the state, he went on later to be the state chairman and to run himself, and 
then sort of retired from New Hampshire politics, though he still leapt his finger in a little bit.  
Was involved in Clinton's successful campaign in 1992, which, and I think was also involved 
with Carter in '76, so he went on to sort of be the, you know, one of those New Hampshire king 
makers after being this kind of back bencher in state legislature. 
 
The state legislature, it's important to understand, in New Hampshire is as large as the Congress. 
 It's sort of three hundred members of the lower house, so it's like every other person in New 
Hampshire is a state legislator.  So it was not a, is not a high honor to be a state legislator, kind 
of anybody who wanted to could sort of get elected.  And so Chris was, you know, but Chris 
built that into a real base.  And we used to have fun together, he'd take us out to the, take us out 
for Greek food, take the whole campaign staff out for Greek food every Friday night.  Another of 
the people we worked with most closely.  Probably Chris and Hugh and Maria of the New 
Hampshire types were the people we worked with the most. 
 
DN:    Now is Maria Carrier from Manchester? 
 
TP:    From Manchester, yeah. 
 
DN:    What was it like working with the Manchester and the New Hampshire politicians? 
 
TP:    Well, most of them were for Muskie, but most of them don't deliver very much, and so we 
had most of the public officials, Senator [Thomas James] McIntyre was the senator then I think, 
and there was a congressman there who served briefly . . . . 
 
DN:    D’Amours? 
 
TP:    [Norman Edward] Norm D’Amours and there was another congressman who served in the 
other district, was elected in '64 and defeated in '66.  I can't remember his name.  French 
Canadian American, I can't remember his name.  But so the whole public officialdom in New 
Hampshire was largely for, either Republican, mostly they were Republicans, and the small 
number who were Democrats were mostly for Muskie.  But - 
 
DN:    What about the Dunfey family? 
 
TP:    Oh, they were, I think they were for Muskie.  They were not, they were sort of more, they 
were more national players, or more, you know, they raise money and were in Boston and Maine 
and so forth and so on.  They were less involved, you know, they provided us with some, we got 
some free hotel rooms in the local Dunfey, not the good Dunfey Hotel, but the run-down Dunfey 
Hotel which is where we sort of, where some of us slept for a couple of months.  But they were 
not, you know, sort of, like active, they were not in the headquarters and actively involved in the 
same way that some of the others were. 
 
DN:    Now, was there a great debate around the reaction that you'd come at the end of the New 
Hampshire campaign, or was this something that just evolved into Senator Muskie's “concession 
speech”, as you put it? 
 
TP:    No, I think, I don't think, I think unfortunately there was no, there were, you know,  it 
would have been smarter if we had had a meeting and figured out what to say, but it sort of just 
happened.  And I think he was clearly disappointed, and said so, and that helped to solidify the 
results. 
 
DN:    What did you do after the New Hampshire campaign? 
 
TP:    I went off, you know, I sort of called in to headquarters and said, “What do I do now?” 
and we were, we sort of went off.  I was sent off to Wisconsin and arrived in Milwaukee a 
couple of days, you know, on Thursday or something, it was like two weeks later was the 
Wisconsin primary.  The Illinois primary was in between, I had handed that off to Jim Johnson in 
the meantime.  And so I went to Wisconsin and Harold Ickes was in charge of Wisconsin, who 
later went on to be deputy chief of staff to President Clinton. 
 
And Harold said, you know, a bunch of people started funneling in from various places around 
the country because we were doing poorly and we, you know, it made no sense to have people 
working in California for the June primary, kind of like everybody started trying to build a 
firewall in Wisconsin.  Wisconsin was heavily Polish, heavily Catholic and moderate and, you 
know, Clem Zablocki was the congressman.  And it was sort of, people thought it was the kind 
of place we should be able to do okay in.  And so I went off to Kenosha and Racine, the first 
congressional district where Les Aspen, who was the sort of, about to be running for, I think it 
was, I don't know if he was running the first time or running for, or was a freshman congressman 
running for reelection.  It was right around the time he ran the first time; we worked a lot with 
him. 
 
But I got a list of the people who were for Muskie from Harold at the headquarters in Milwaukee 
and went down and started calling them up in Kenosha and Racine.  And it turned out that half of 
them were McGovern delegates, and indeed they were on the list, they were on the Muskie list.  
Some of them wrote to Senator Muskie after he gave his famous speech in 1968 saying, “I want 
to help you if you want to run.”  And then the next person who called them was me.  So, you 
know, McGovern had stayed at their house in the meantime three times.  And so it turned out 
that we again had like all the public officials who didn't, you know, who sort of thought they 
were entitled to go to the convention as our delegates, but they didn't want to work at this.  And 
so we ended up doing credibly well in the first congressional district, but McGovern winning the 
primary and that was sort of, that was kind of, you know, we weren't.  I ran back to Boston to 
sort of do, to do the Massachusetts primary and had the same experience. 
 
All the politicians who were for us, you know, all the politicians who were insisting on being, on 
standing next to the candidate and being, and having the most exalted title, wouldn't return our 
phone calls then.  One exception I should say that's important to point out for history's sake is 
Mike Dukakis, who was one of the seven co-chairs of the “Muskie for President” campaign in 
Massachusetts, and was the only one who kept working after Wisconsin.  So he kept coming in 
to the office, kept giving speeches, kept doing radio interviews.  Everybody else was, the other 
six co-chairs were all on vacation for the last two weeks before the primary.  But Michael, you 
know, I always admired him for keeping his commitments.  It's the kind of thing I always 
thought that Ed Muskie would do, too, so it was a good thing. 
 
But then, you know, it sort of turned out that he dropped out and decided not to pursue his active 
candidacy, or I don't remember how he said it, but he was on his way to the Ohio primary, I 
remember that, and sort of kept postponing his departure from Washington to Ohio by one city 
or one event, and then eventually just said, “I'm not coming at all,” and pulled out here. 
 
DN:    What was your sense about the reasons why Ed Muskie, whom you felt would make a 
great president, wasn't an effective candidate in the primaries, or not for the nomination? 
 
TP:    Well, I think he, I think in part he tried to run a general election campaign in the 
primaries.  You know, he's a unifier, he's run in a state that's not heavily, that was not when he 
started very heavily Democratic.  And the Democratic primary electorate is, you know, is sort 
the base enthusiasts of the party.  And he's the guy who's ideal to get you from forty percent to 
fifty-one percent or fifty-five percent.  But the people who made the blood surge in the veins 
were George McGovern, who, and that was, you know, George McGovern had his twenty-five 
percent, but his twenty-five percent all turned out to vote.  And Muskie's supporters were, you 
know, were for him but not for him hard enough. 
 
And I think he, I don't think he was quite prepared for the rough and tumble of it or for what it 
was like, or for how simple, you know, I think he's a complicated thinker, he worked hard on 
complicated issues from foreign policy to environmental policy.  And you know, presidential 
campaigns are more about bumper stickers and sound bites than they are about things like 
balancing the equity interests of the Clean Air Act. 
 
So, I think he would have been a marvelous president, but I think he, the skills that made him a 
very fine senator sort of made him talk in policy terms, made him talk in complicated terms.  
And you know, for McGovern, for the other candidates, and other candidates who have run 
subsequently made it, you know, “it's the economy stupid,” is not something that Muskie could 
ever say, you know, whenever he was running.  So he, I think his, I think he, I think, you know, I 
think he did a credible job, I think he served the country well, I think he, I was proud, I still am 
proud to have worked for him.  But his approach to public service was not as simplistic as it 
needed to be, or as emotional as it needed to be. 
 
And so, I also think he was, partly it was an ideological question, he was sort of a centrist 
candidate, not just stylistically but philosophically.  And the centrists have a harder time, you 
know, the extremes tend to nominate the parties' candidates and don't always nominate the strong 
general election candidate, and that's certainly what happened in 1972, you know.  He carried 
Massachusetts and the District of Columbia as I recall? 
 
So, but the base, the party was really enthusiastic.  I mean, George McGovern was flying around 
the country thinking he was going to win because he got twenty-five thousand people would 
greet him every time he got off the plane.  But it was, you know, it was the, he got his twenty, 
the twenty-five percent were really, really enthusiastic about him but he never, he could barely 
get to forty.  Whereas Ed Muskie had the opposite problem, so I don't know.  It was the nature of 
the way these things work. 
 
DN:    Unfortunately, we're out of time for this morning, Tony.  Thank you very much. 
 
TP:    Pleasure. 
 
Continuation of Interview, September 18, 2002 
 
DN:    It is Wednesday, the 18th of September 2002.  This is our second round of September 
2002 interviews with Tony Podesta.  Tony, were there any things that we missed the other day, 
from your point of view, in our conversation? 
 
TP:    Well, Senator Muskie, you know, I made it sound like the only two things that, the only 
two times he came to New Hampshire were one to cry and the other to concede, or the two times 
I saw him anyway.  That was certainly not the case.  He was, you know, he was there a lot, he 
interacted a lot.  He was in Chicago when I was doing, when I was, in the early days, 
superintending the campaign in Illinois, helping us to put together a very widespread coalition of 
all the leading elected officials and people who helped raise money in campaigns and the like.  
You know, he's a, you know, was a sort of engaging, gregarious, charming, occasionally 
cantankerous, occasionally misanthropic guy, but.  Another New Hampshire story that is worth 
telling is the story of Rose Economou.  I don't know if you had that story from someone else, or 
know it somewhere else. 
 
DN:    No. 
 
TP:    She was the first, the Muskie campaign broke new ground in hiring the very first of all 
time woman advance person.  It seems unthinkable sitting here in 2002, that thirty one years ago 
there wasn't such an animal.  And Rose Economou was the first advance woman, and she went, 
she worked in the Muskie campaign.  Actually, I knew her from Chicago, we went to college 
together and I was involved in getting her into the campaign.  And there was a sort of some 
controversy about whether, you know, whether a woman who, you know, can you go wake up 
the senator, could you, what if he wants, what if he's in his tub and he wants to talk to you, what 
if you're supposed to brief him and he's on the can? 
 
And, you know, there were sort of all of these reasons that, looking back thirty years ago, 
seemed like totally preposterous.  But these were all active conversations; I mean there was a 
sort of active discussion that went on in the campaign.  Mike Casey was the head of advance, 
and Eliot Cutler was the director of scheduling, and I and others were sort of, you know, in this 
conversation about how it would really be a good thing if Ed Muskie were to, you know, who 
was such a ground breaker in so many other ways would break this barrier for women.  It's a 
small barrier - 
 
DN:    And you three felt that way? 
 
TP:    Well yeah, I think, yeah, I think, and eventually everybody sort of went along with it.  
Some of the older folks in the campaign, you know, Berl Bernhard and George Mitchell and 
others were sort of, who had been through this a few times before couldn't imagine the idea of a, 
you know, of the senator listening to a woman, or following a woman through a crowd, or 
taking, having a woman take him out of his hotel room.  But she did a marvelous job, she did a, 
she was one of our advance stars.  And he became, I think, quite fond of her and enjoyed their 
encounters together.  And she, there was actually, some, one magazine, I don't remember if it 
was Harper's or someone else, did actually a little blurb on this, as the first advance woman in 
the history of the world.  And that happened in New Hampshire, too, so there are lots of, you 
know, there are lots of good memories as well. 
 
And just, you know, he was, he had such integrity and was so much at home with, when he was 
sitting around with a group of, you know, twenty voters in Claremont or, you know, or, you 
know, this was a man who was completely at home with himself and there was no canned speech 
and there was no, there were no note cards.  He just kind of felt like he was, he felt in New 
Hampshire like he was talking to his neighbors.  That wasn't always true in some other parts of 
the country, but that was always true there. 
 
DN:    Did you observe him in Illinois, for example, with voters? 
 
TP:    Yes, but it was, you know, in the early days it was much more come in and raise money 
and come in and get, you know, this congressman or that alderman or this political factotum 
signed on to the campaign, and we were trying to put together the delegate slate, stuff like that.  
So it was much more, it wasn't, we were not doing retail campaigning in Illinois while I was 
there.  And after I turned it over to, I turned the campaign over to Jim Johnson at some point 
toward the end of '70, toward the end of 1971 after having done it for the first five or six months. 
 And then the senator went and campaigned there, you know, after he left New Hampshire. 
 
DN:    Did you see any difference in the way he reacted to the kind of sessions you had in 
Illinois and the sessions that you described in New Hampshire where he was talking to rank and 
file voters? 
 
TP:    Well, I mean I saw him campaign more, actually I saw him more campaigning with rank 
and file voters in Wisconsin than I did in Illinois.  You know, he was always, I was never able to 
tell whether, I think there are two theories, he seemed more comfortable in New Hampshire.  He 
seemed more at home, more at ease.  Now that could have been because he was the front runner 
and doing well, and it could be that when he came, by the time he came to Wisconsin he was sort 
of, you know, had three purple hearts and was walking on crutches. 
 
But he always seemed to me to be, you know, the sort of Midwestern auto workers were always 
a little different from the people he met in New Hampshire.  They sound a little different, they 
talk a little different, they had different concerns and ideas, and they . . . . So I think he, I think, I 
don't mean to say he was not at home there but I think he sort of felt a kind of comfort in New 
England that was very much part of his grounding, part of where he, you know, part of what he 
understood America to be like. 
 
I think, you know, when he spoke from Maine to the rest of the country in that famous speech in 
'68, it was not, it was clear that he was speaking from Maine, he was clearly speaking as 
someone of Maine, but he was also, spoke well to the whole country.  But in terms of his, in 
terms of the way he walked around, it was always much, it was always easier I think in New 
Hampshire. 
 
But in Wisconsin, that was really sort of the last, that was kind of the last time that we interacted 
a lot after, I went back from Wisconsin to Massachusetts.  And he spent a little time there, but 
that was again mostly sort of fund raising, politicians, press conference, and to the airport.  In 
some ways I think the campaign sort of may well have kind of loosened him from his moorings, 
as he was trying to, you know, three media markets a day and riding around in the back seat of a 
limousine and, you know, kind of go from press conference to press conference and fund raiser 
to fund raiser.  He never really, you know, after a point he never really had a chance to talk to 
anybody anymore.  And I think, you know, I think he, you know, he was sort of an aficionado of 
New England town meetings, and of the legislative process in Washington, and that he was very 
good at both those things.  But neither of them had much to do with what the campaign was like. 
So that went well. 
 
DN:    And as you looked at the campaign, did you get any sense of a strategy that was being 
pursued? 
 
TP:    Well, the strat-, I mean, yeah, the strategy I guess was a little bit related to inevitability, a 
little bit related to electability, but there wasn't much of an issue focus.  There wasn't a, people 
weren't given a, you know, everyone was told who was for him, and everybody was told you 
have to be for him, but I don't think we did as good as we might have in telling people what a 
difference it would make if you were for him, and how being for him would help make the 
country better, help make the world better.  And to some extent his, we got into, we got sort of, 
we got I think a little more into endorsements and fund raising and a little bit away from issues. 
 
I mean, I think that he had such a good record in the Senate, and we tended to talk about that; he 
was an accomplished senator but we didn't talk about what he'd really done.  So I think that, you 
know, George McGovern came along and said vote for me and I'll end the war.  People 
understood that, you know, cause-effect.  And, you know, vote for, whereas our message was 
more, you know, vote for him because he's going to win, and I don't think, you know, people 
didn't care that much about that, especially New Hampshire.  New Hampshire loves knocking 
down, loves to knock down people who are, you know, who think they're, who think they've got 
it made, and we had some of that. 
 
DN:    I know you'd gone to university in Massachusetts, but was it a culture shock at all for a 
young man from Chicago to come into New Hampshire and deal with politics there? 
 
TP:    Well, you couldn't understand what they were saying half the time, so there was a sort of, 
there was a kind of, it was a question of whether we spoke the same language.  But I managed as 
a result of my brief time at MIT, much to the consternation of my friends in Chicago, to actually 
pick up something of a New England accent.  When I went back home at the end of the first 
semester at graduate school, I found my family was making fun of the way I talked, as opposed 
to my making fun of the way everybody else talked when I first went to Boston.  So it's, I guess 
it's contagious. 
 
But politics is politics, I mean, it's, you know, I kind of grew up watching Mayor Daley stitch 
together an organization and provide service to people and provide an idea of what, you know, 
make a difference in people's lives and, you know, be sure to ask them for their vote.  There was 
never, you know, never an election went by when the mayor didn't ask for your vote, and when 
the precinct captain didn't ask for your vote, and you know, those lessons are, you know, 
sometimes a little bit lost in the era of thirty second attack ads. 
 
And especially when you go to places like Iowa and New Hampshire, which have a tradition of 
citizen activism and people expecting to actually, you know, people say, “Well I've only met 
three of the candidates so far, you know, I haven't made up my mind yet.”  Well, it's not an, you 
know, it's not an uncommon thing in New Hampshire.  Or, “I only met him twice so far, I'm not 
really sure what I think.”  Whereas in much of the rest of the country it's, you know, politics is a 
spectator sport, not a participatory sport.  So, but in Chicago it's a participatory sport, and in New 
England it's a little bit more like, in a funny way more like Chicago than, certainly than 
California or Florida or some of the, you know, some of the states that, the big states that tend to 
have big events happening in them these days. 
 
DN:    Was your family involved in politics directly? 
 
TP:    My father was, my father served admirably in the role of voter.  He tended to vote all the 
time, that was as much as he ever did.  And my mother got a patronage job as an election day 
worker, this was a, this was not, this was . . . . She was interested in public affairs and interested 
in politics, but this was also sort of a way for the machine to, you know, essentially provide a 
small reward for a couple dozen women who were free during the day.  You know, give them, I 
don't know, probably it was ten bucks then, or maybe five bucks then, to sit and check off the 
names at the polling place.  But we never, you know, we never went to political meetings, we 
never signed up things.  My mother would talk a lot.  She was a, she and I were both night owls 
so we'd watch late night talk shows, which there was one in Chicago where people would talk 
about politics and public life a lot.  So she and I were then sort of, were interested in that.  My 
dad was never that interested in it.  And eventually my brother and I ended up sort of living the 
life, so my mother must have affected us in some way. 
 
DN:    Did, what was her attitude toward Mayor Daley? 
 
TP:    I think we all felt Mayor Daley was a damn good mayor.  I think that the convention was 
hard to swallow, I think the civil rights era was difficult.  I mean, you know, I, I mean we lived 
in a completely white neighborhood, you know, sort of like, if some Black person walked on the 
street someone would call the police.   And, but, you know, you go to college and you meet a 
diverse group of people and you have a different set of values.  And Martin Luther King, when 
he came to Chicago to sort of try to organize, said he'd never seen hatred in Mississippi or 
Alabama like he saw in Chicago. 
 
It's here, I mean it's sort of a, so, so I think, you know, I think that I'm, you know, in terms of the 
convention, in terms of issues of race, there's some stuff in Mayor Daley's career that the, that his 
son the current Mayor Daley would, well, I'm sure he's damn proud of his dad, I'm sure, you 
know, he would never, he wouldn't do the same things the same way.  But, you know, I think the 
country's changed a lot, so I don't, you know, I don't bear him any ill will.  I still think he was a 
terrifically talented public servant, if slightly tongue tied from time to time.  But - 
 
DN:    At the time of coming out of the '68 convention and then getting into that campaign, did 
you, did that have a traumatic effect on you, or was it simply one of those things you live 
through? 
 
TP:    No, it wasn't traumatic.  I mean it was, you know, it was very disturbing, it was very 
troubling, it was awful, it was terrible, you know.  You'd see friends, you know, friends of yours 
walking down the hallway, you know, in the Conrad Hilton Hotel being hit over the head with a 
billy club is not a, you know, it's not an experience that you, you know, put aside or expect as an 
American.  You know, you see that stuff on TV in Bolivia or, you know, or in Russia, but you 
don't see that kind of, that stuff doesn't happen in this country.  So it was, you know, it was very 
troubling. 
 
It was not, it didn't, you know, I don't think any of us who were involved in the campaign were, 
sort of said, well this is evidence of the, how terrible and corrupt the system is, we're dropping 
out.  I think everyone, you know, two or,  that may have happened to some volunteers here and 
there, but of all the people who had, who were sort of really working in the campaign.  And a 
bunch of us met right afterwards in the, like right around, I think it was in late August, it was 
after the Democratic convention, maybe it was right around Labor Day at a sort of reunion of all 
the senior people in the McCarthy campaign in Martha's Vineyard, and if my memory serves me 
correctly, Governor [Philip H.] Hoff of Vermont came and talked to us and said, we need you 
guys in the campaign, you know, we can't, there's a real difference here. 
 
And some, you know, a lot, I think a lot of people took, I think people didn't sort of go straight 
from Grant Park and the Conrad Hilton into the Humphrey headquarters without missing a beat.  
So I think a lot of us needed to, you know, needed a week or two to recover from that 
experience.  But, you know, come, by the time the, early September rolled around people were 
willing to work again, and understood that even though they had spent, you know, had spent six 
or eight months tangling with Hubert Humphrey, he was some, you know, he was a hell of a lot 
better than the other guy. 
 
And, you know, you sort of, anytime in the primary you kind of, you get madder at the guy who, 
the guy who you agree with most of the time than you do with the guy who you don't agree with 
at all because you're not running against him at that point.  So I think for me, and probably like, 
pretty much like everybody else, it kind of took a week or two or three to kind of, you know, sort 
of just say, I need some rest, I need to get over this, this is, how could this have happened, to say, 
in a, you know.  You start, first you start thinking about yourself and then you start thinking 
about Nixon and the country and you say, I better get off my duff and do something, so that's sort 
of I think what a lot of us went through. 
 
DN:    As you look back on your experience of '68, '72 and beyond, what sticks in your mind as 
most important about Ed Muskie, his impact on you, and also his legacy? 
 
TP:    I think his strength of character, his integrity, his, the fact that he was not, you know, the 
fact that he had a core as a person and as a public servant, and a set of values that he didn't, you 
know, he didn't need to sort of go, you know, I mean, there must have been a pollster in the 
campaign but I can't remember who it was. 
 
DN:    Anna Navarro, a young woman, very able. 
 
TP:    Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, okay.  So, so, that, you know, that, I mean now it's sort of like, you 
know, the pollster is the one, the pollster is the person who wakes up the candidate in the 
morning and tells him what to say and, you know, rides in the car on the way to the debate.  And, 
you know, and all the, you know, the speech lines are all polled and tested.  So I mean I think 
that, I don't mean to denigrate polling, I'm just saying I think Ed Muskie had, you know, had a 
kind of strength of character and integrity that is, that we could use more of, that we could use 
more of now. 
 
And I certainly, I certainly remember, I certainly remember fondly there were, he was not a 
person who suffered fools gladly, or who kept his disappointment to himself.  So, you know, so 
being yelled at by him was not one of the things that, not one of the things that, you know, it 
never made you, it never made me want to kind of get discouraged or say, “Oh hell, I'm walking 
out on this.”  It always made me want to do better because he always held himself to a high 
standard, and he held all of us to a high standard. 
 
So, you know, I feel that way about it, but I feel, I guess I look back on it a little bit like, I don't 
know, could we have found, you know, three thousand, two thousand extra votes in New 
Hampshire and gotten the fifty-one percent and, you know.  Or maybe if I had said, “It's stupid to 
get up at nine o'clock in the morning and go attack Bill Loeb,” or someone had said that.  I 
wasn't the only one there, you know, there were like eight or ten of us there sitting with him on 
the night before he went to cry. 
 It wasn't, you know, I mean it's kind of like he, part of it was he was such a strong guy that he 
said, this is what I want to do, and it was, you know, most of the time people didn't talk back to 
him, people didn't say, ‘now have you thought about this?’ or ‘does that really make sense?’ or 
whatever.  It's kind of like once he barked a command, there was a, everybody else just sort of 
fell in line, which is probably a weakness as well as a strength. 
 
DN:    Thank you very much, Tony. 
 
TP:    Pleasure. 
 
End of Interview 
